Please write a 2 to 3 page case study about “BP in Russia: Bad Partners or Bad Partnerships? (A)” (Case study 3: Strategic Management: Competitiveness and Globalization 12e: Hitt, Ireland, Hoskisson (page C42). Following is an example of the case study. Also, help me with some ideas to respond to the above questions. Since entering the Russian oil market in 1997, BP plc (BP) had two main partners. The first was Rosneft, the Russian state-owned oil major. The second was Alpha Access Renova (AAR), a consortium of Soviet-born oligarchs and one of Russia’s largest privately owned financial-industrial conglomerates, with interests in oil, gas, and banking. In January of 2011, BP and Rosneft announced the formation of a new strategic partnership to develop oil and gas reserves on the continental shelf in the Russian Arctic, covering approximately 125,000 square kilometers in the Kara Sea. Yet within five months, AAR, with whom BP had already formed another partnership, would obtain a series of court injunctions, effectively scuttling the deal with Rosneft. The failure of the BP-Rosneft alliance could be attributed to a lack of due diligence on BP’s part or, perhaps more saliently, to poor alliance management. A key conditional variable of any alliance is the degree of interpartner conflict: Alliance partners’ interests can diverge so much that they undermine the initial common goals of the partnership, and “effective cooperation demands a relatively low level of conflict.” In the wake of the Deepwater Horizon disaster in the Gulf of Mexico, which cost them tens of billions of U.S. dollars, BP’s interest was in expanding its oil assets and revenues. AAR’s interest, meanwhile, was in maintaining TNK-BP’s position in the Russian oil market, which the BP-Rosneft alliance would have undermined new distinct oil companies was created, including Yukos, Onako, Sibneft, Tyumen (TNK), Lukeoil, Sidanko, and Slavneft, and beginning in 1995, stakes in these companies were sold at auction. In 1999, AAR purchased a 51% interest in TNK, with the state retaining 49%.5 From 1993 until 1999, Russian oil production was consistently third largest in the world, behind the United States and Saudi Arabia, but following the privatization auctions, Russian production increased steadily, eventually by over 50%. By 2004, Russia had overtaken the United States as the second largest oil producer globally. Russian privatization Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1992, the Russian government under Premier Boris Yeltsin initiated a series of reforms to end the oil ministry’s monopoly over the Russian oil and gas industry. A group of Sidanko filed for bankruptcy, and in an auction of its assets, TNK bought the western Siberian oil field of Chernogorneft—approximately half of Sidanko’s asset value—for a fraction of its real value. BP objected, publicly accusing TNK of tampering with the courts to “influence the bankruptcy proceedings and liquidation sales.”6 In response to the allegations, TNK agreed to return the Chernogorneft oil field to Sidanko in exchange for an equity stake of 25% plus one share (for veto power) in the company. Under the terms of the agreement, BP maintained its 10% stake, but its voting rights were increased to equal to those of TNK (25% plus one share necessary for a blocking vote)7 . Additionally, BP received managerial authority over Sidanko and its subsidiaries, effectively giving BP control over the highly prized Chernogorneft oil field.8 In 2002, BP purchased an additional 15% stake in Sidanko for $375 million USD, increasing its stake to 25%; AAR maintained its 56% stake. The Chernogorneft oil field dispute resolved, BP publicly expressed interest in expanding its involvement in Russian oil and initiated preliminary talks with AAR about buying a stake in TNK. The next year, BP agreed to invest $6.75 billion USD in a 50/50 joint venture with AAR, to be known as TNK-BP. The venture incorporated both companies’ holdings in Sidanko, AAR’s controlling interest in TNK and 50% share of Slavneft. The agreement also included the following: Both companies’ interests in Russia Petroleum [the critical component of which was the Kovyotka gas field license], exploration opportunities offshore Sakhalin Island, and a major downstream business that includes interest in five refineries and a retail network of more than 2,100 sites in Russia and Ukraine.10 By December 2005, TNK-BP had completed a voluntary share exchange program for the minority shareholders in 14 TNK-BP subsidiaries, thereby facilitating the accession of Sidanko, TNK, and OAO Onako to TNK-BP Holding; the three companies were liquidated, and all their assets and liabilities were consolidated within the holding company.11 In the next few years, a series of legal disputes ensued among the Russian government, AAR, and BP. At the time, there was speculation that TNK-BP would be the target of a takeover by Gazprom, the largest statecontrolled gas company, which had been taking control of oil projects across Russia, including a Royal Dutch Shell project in 2006.12 In 2007, in the wake of state allegations that it had violated license terms, TNK-BP agreed to sell its east Siberian Kovykta gas field to Gazprom.13 In 2008, Russian police raided TNK-BP’s Moscow offices as part of an alleged criminal probe. Tensions between BP and AAR flared in June 2008, when AAR shareholders in TNK-BP “threatened BP with legal action to strip BP-nominated directors of their powers in TNK-BP.”14 This threat ultimately led to the ouster of TNK-BP CEO Bob Dudley and the creation of a board of directors for TNK-BP that was meant to ensure equal representation for both BP and AAR.15 In January 2009, Mikhail Fridman of AAR had taken over as chairman of TNK-BP. “Mr. Fridman’s appointment was perceived as BP’s final admission that it was ready to cede influence” to AAR.16 In November of the same year, Maxim Brodsky was nominated as TNK-BP’s new chief executive. BP and Rosneft Back in 1998, shortly after purchasing its initial 10% stake in Sidanko, BP began a joint venture with Rosneft to explore and mine licensed areas of Sakhalin Island, off the east coast of Russia, with oil and natural gas reserves estimated at over ten billion tons. In 2002, the two firms announced a joint project to explore and develop an area of the island known as Sakhalin-5. Rosneft took on 51% of the project, while BP would be the minority shareholder at 49%.17 An additional project to explore another area, Sakhalin-4, followed in 2006. Both Sakhalin projects were developed under a carry agreement, in which BP funded all exploration and Rosneft was only liable for costs if the project was successful. The alliance had cost approximately $80 million USD through 2006; after the second Sakhalin site was added, the cost of the project in its entirety was estimated to be an additional $700 million USD.18 But according to both companies, continued exploration offered no significant economic value, so the two majors allowed the Sakhalin-4 license to expire in 2008 and the Sakhalin-5 license two years later. The companies continued joint exploration of other sites surrounding the island, with some success. Questions: 1. Strategic profile and case analysis purpose 2. Situation analysis 1. General environment analysis 2. Competitor analysis 3. Internal analysis 3. Identification of environmental opportunities and threats and firm strengths and weaknesses (SWOT) 4. Strategy formulation 1. Strategic alternatives 2. Alternative evaluation 3. Alternative choice 5. Strategic alternative implementation 1. Action items 2. Action plan
Please write a 2 to 3 page case study about “BP in Russia: Bad Partners or Bad Partnerships? (A)” (Case study 3: Strategic Management: Competitiveness and Globalization 12e: Hitt, Ireland, Hoskisson (page C42). Following is an example of the case study. Also, help me with some ideas to respond to the above questions. Since entering the Russian oil market in 1997, BP plc (BP) had two main partners. The first was Rosneft, the Russian state-owned oil major.
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